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Elimination: The Role of 
Product Differentiation and 
Market Structure 
Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stem 
Recent  empirical  literature  evaluating  the  trade  and  welfare  effects of  the 
proposed U.S.  -Canada free trade area (FTA) has emphasized  the significant 
gains associated with tariff removal on trade in differentiated products. In this 
connection,  there  are  two  welfare  conclusions  concerning  U.  S .-Canada 
bilateral  tariff elimination that tend to dominate the public discussion of the 
trade  initiative.  The  first  conclusion  emphasized  by  the  proponents  of  a 
U.  S  .-Canada FTA relates to the mutual gains from capturing scale economies 
and increased product  variety  that  access to each other’s market  will  make 
possible.  Moreover,  the  influx  of  tariff-free  imports  will  improve  the 
competitive environment  for firms selling domestically,  with the result that 
these firms must either exit or reduce cost. Free trade, then, is expected  to 
rationalize the production process by increasing output per firm and lowering 
average total cost. 
The predicted gains from liberalization draw heavily from the literature that 
compares autarky and free trade (e.g., Krugman 1979; and Markusen  1981). 
However,  from a theoretical  perspective, the question  of  whether  there are 
gains from liberalization  is distinct  from the question  of  whether  there  are 
gains from trade. U.S. and Canadian firms already enjoy substantial access to 
each  other’s markets.  Post-Tokyo  Round  bilateral  tariffs  on  U.S.-Canada 
trade  are quite low,  averaging  less than  2 percent. Furthermore, Canadian 
firms are subjected to the efficiency-stimulating experience of competing with 
U.S.  firms  in  the  U.S.  market.  Whether  small  tariff  changes  lead  to 
rationalization  depends  on  certain characteristics  of  the  input  markets,  as 
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Flam and Helpman (1987) have shown, as well as the procompetitive effects 
emphasized in the gains-from-trade  literature. 
Second,  the  emphasis on  trade  in  differentiated  products  in  evaluating 
liberalization  leads to the conclusion  that increased  trade  will be  primarily 
intraindustry. Interindustry resource reallocation  necessary  under an FTA is 
therefore presumed to be minimal. On the other hand, the policy debate has 
tended  to  downplay  the  terms-of-trade  changes  typically  associated  with 
tariffs,  resource  movements  due to interindustry  trade, or the  second-best 
nature of bilateral tariff reductions. 
Aside from the theoretical  welfare issues, there are some basic modeling 
choices that arise in evaluating the bilateral tariff  elimination using comput- 
able general equilibrium techniques. In particular, U.  S.  -Canada bilateral trade 
flows that are the subject of  tariff removal must be identifiable. 
There are four basic approaches to this problem. First, there is the textbook 
model that examines the case in which each good is homogeneous across firms 
and countries. The implication of this framework is that some bilateral trade 
flows  will  cease  with  bilateral  tariff  elimination.  Typically,  the  smaller 
country in the FTA will trade within the FTA only. 
In  order to avoid this  particular  pattern  of  trade in which  some bilateral 
trade flows disappear, it is common to adopt some form of product or market 
differentiation.  One popular  approach has been to assume that products are 
differentiated  by  place  of  production, embodied in  the  Armington  (1969) 
assumptions.  Alternatively,  there  are two other modeling  approaches  that 
draw on the behavior of imperfectly competitive firms. The first is to assume 
that there is product differentiation at the firm level rather than at the national 
level. The second alternative is to assume that all firms supply a homogeneous 
product but that national markets are segmented, as in Venables (1985). Thus, 
firms make separate price and supply decisions for each national market based 
on the perceived elasticity of demand. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze some important issues that arise in 
the modeling of bilateral tariff  removal and to assess these issues computa- 
tionally in the context of the U.S.-Canada FTA.  Our paper is structured  as 
follows.  The differentiated  products  models are discussed in the  following 
section,  and the  theoretical  relation  between  tariff  liberalization  and  firm 
output is developed.  We also comment on the demand structure adopted  in 
some previous modeling efforts. In particular we will discuss the practice of 
assuming both firm and national product differentiation  and the implications 
for the debate concerning intra- versus interindustry trade, rationalization of 
the production process,  and the gains from trade. 
In section 7.2, we present a market  segmentation  model  and discuss the 
likely welfare implications of  bilateral tariff  removal. The issues raised are 
then illustrated using a computational model designed to analyze U.  S .-Canada 
bilateral tariff  removal. The model is discussed  in section 7.3, and compu- 
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7.1  The Differentiated Products Models 
The  earliest  versions  of  the  differentiated  products  models  involved 
differentiating by country of origin using the Armington assumptions.  “Love 
of variety”  in the utility function guarantees that all bilateral trade flows will 
continue following the formation of  the preferential trading club as long as 
industries  are not  eliminated  in  any  country.  Models  of  this  type  tend  to 
assume that production is characterized by constant returns to scale and that 
firms are perfectly competitive. 
There  is  an  important  difficulty,  however,  with  the  national  product 
differentiation (NPD) model insofar as it means that each country will have a 
monopoly  in  the  supply  of  its  own  characteristic  variety.2 Consequently, 
optimal  tariffs  tend  to be  large, even for  small  countries.  Terms-of-trade 
changes, rather than efficiency gains, therefore dominate the welfare predic- 
tions of NPD models. 
National  product  differentiation  is the approach  adopted  by  Brown  and 
Stern (1987), who find that Canada’s welfare declines by 0.3 percent as the 
result  of  bilateral  tariff  removal.  This  result  appears to emerge  because 
removal  of  the relatively  high tariffs currently  in place  in Canada leads to 
deterioration in the terms of trade. On the other hand, Hamilton and Whalley 
(1985) consider  nontariff  barrier  (NTB) removal as well  as bilateral  tariff 
removal and find that Canada enjoys a 0.7 percent increase of  GDP from the 
formation of an FTA, presumably because of the relatively high NTBs in the 
United  States. 
An alternative is to differentiate products at the firm level, using the Dixit- 
Stiglitz-Spence form of the utility function. Love of variety will again guarantee 
the existence of  all bilateral trade flows since no two firms in the world sell 
the same variety. In this model, firms are typically assumed to have downward- 
sloping average total cost curves and to be monopolistically  competitive. 
Harris (1984) developed  the imperfectly competitive  approach, computa- 
tionally, incorporating a variety of  different assumptions concerning a firm’s 
price-setting behavior.  The Harris approach  yielded  startling results.  Multi- 
lateral  pre-Tokyo  Round  tariff  removal  was  shown to  increase  Canada’s 
welfare by  up to  9 percent  of  GDP, depending on the precise  assumptions 
concerning firm behavior.  Increasing  firm output, thereby  reducing average 
total  cost,  is a key  source of  welfare  gain  in  the imperfectly  competitive 
computational trade models. Subsequent revisions of tariff data and parame- 
ters of the model, however, place the welfare gain for Canada in the Harris 
model closer to 2.5 percent of GDP.3 
In this section, we will first describe a typical monopolistically competitive 
(MC)  trade  model  and evaluate the effects of  tariff  liberalization  on firm 
output. The NPD model and the MC model are then compared in terms of the 
implications of a tariff  for the terms of trade and intra- versus interindustry 
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Assume  a  model  consisting  of  n  traded  goods that  are  produced  by  m 
countries.  Good j  produced  by  each  firm  in  each  of  the  m  countries  is 
aggregated  using  a  linearly  homogeneous aggregation  function  to form  a 
composite  good j. Following  Spence (1976) and Dixit  and  Stiglitz  (1977), 
modelers have typically chosen the constant elasticity of  substitution  (CES) 
function to aggregate different varieties into a single aggregate. The condi- 
tional demand in country  i for the product of a representative firm  in country 
r that produces good j  for a CES aggregation function is 
s= I 
where cJ  is the price paid in country i for good j  produced by a representative 
firm in country r, E,J is expenditure in country i on the aggregate good j,  n, 
is the number of firms in industry j  in country  s, and a > 1 is the elasticity 
of  substitution among the different varieties. 
Firms set price as a markup over marginal cost according to 
(2)  P5 = MC,(l + I/qr,)-', 
where Pz, is the price received by a representative producer of j  in country r. 
T~~ < -  1 is the firm's perceived elasticity of demand, and MC,,  is marginal 
cost. The firm's perceived elasticity of demand is a sales-weighted average of 
the elasticities of  demand in each national market. The elasticity of demand 
in country i for the product of  a representative  firm in country r is obtained 





qLJ  =  -a + (a  - 1)-, 
Ell 
0; 
qLJ  = -a + (a  - 1)-, 
nrj 
where 0;  is country r's share of the market in country i for good j. 
The firm's production function requires a fixed input of capital plus variable 
capital and labor inputs that  are characterized  by  constant  returns  to scale. 
Thus, the average total cost (ATC) curve is downward sloping, and marginal 
cost is constant. Entry occurs until profits are eliminated, requiring the firm's 
price to equal ATC: 
where PF  is the price of capital in country r, 
variable  capital  unit input  requirement  in 
w,  is the return to labor, a:  is the 
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requirement, KF  is the fixed capital requirement, and qrJ  is output of a typical 
firm in industry j in country r. 
Capital and labor are assumed to be mobile between sectors. The return to 
each factor is determined to equate demand to a fixed supply. 
Finally, tariff  policy serves to link the price received by the seller to the 
price paid by the buyer.  Thus, 
(5) 
where r;,  is the ad valorem tariff that country  i imposes on imports of goodj 
from country r. 
K, = p*p + q), 
7.1.1  Rationalization 
We  now examine the conditions under which tariff liberalization will lead 
to rationalization of production in this model. That is, will a tariff reduction 
increase output per firm and lower ATC? There are several considerations that 
determine  the  effect  of  liberalization  on rationalization,  such as  differing 
factor  intensities  across  industries  and  the  effect  of  liberalization  of  the 
elasticity of  demand. 
Turning first to the production  side, suppose that there are two industries 
and that industry 1’s fixed capital input requirement is zero. Throughout this 
exercise, we will hold the shape of the demand curve fixed so as to focus on 
technological determinants of firm output. 
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that 
(6)  L  = a4Qi + a4nzqz  9 
where L is the endowment of labor, Q1 is the output of industry  1, and n,q, 
is output of  industry 2. Proportionate differentiation  yields 
(6‘)  ALL&  + AL&  + A,)  = 8Jk -PK), 
where  8,  = AL,O,,a,  + AL20~2u2,  Ad  is  industry j’s share of  the employ- 
ment of factorf,  0,  is factorf’s  share of total cost in industryj, 0J  is variable 
factor f’s share of  variable  cost  in  industry j, and  u,  is the  elasticity  of 
substitution between capital and labor in industry j. 
Similarly, capital market equilibrium requires 
(7) 
which, when proportionately  differentiated,  yields 
K  = afQ, + aFnn,q, + n,KF, 
(7‘) 
where  6,  = A,,0,,u,  + X~,0,V,a2,  A;,  is variable  capital  in  industry  2’s 
share of  capital  employment,  A:,  is fixed  capital  in  industry  2’s share of 
capital employment, and  A;,  + At2 = A,,  is industry  2’s  share of  capital 
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A tariff reduction will lower demand for the domestically produced good, 
yielding negative profits for domestic firms. The question is whether output 
per firm in industry 2 will rise or fall as firms exit. Suppose first that q2  is held 
constant  as n, falls so that  firms  neither rationalize  nor derationalize.  The 
markup pricing rule used by firms requires that the percentage change in price 
be equal to the percentage change in marginal cost if the elasticity of  demand 
is held constant. Therefore, 
(8)  P, = e,v2io + eK2PK. 
On  the  other hand,  the  zero-profit  condition  requires  that  the  percentage 
change in price be equal to the percent change in ATC. Therefore, 
(9) 
Now, as industry 2 contracts and industry  1 expands, relative factor prices 
must also be adjusting. As a result, equations (8) and (9) cannot be satisfied 
simultaneously  if output per firm is held constant. This conclusion  follows 
from the assumption that capital is the only fixed factor, which implies that 
labor’s share of  variable cost must be greater than labor’s share of  total cost 
and that capital’s share of variable cost must be smaller than capital’s share of 
total cost. 
The necessary  change in  firm  output  will  depend on the  relative  factor 
intensity ranking of the two industries. It can be demonstrated using equations 
(6’) and  (7‘) that,  if  industry  2  is  the  capital-intensive  industry  ranked 
according  to  its  variable  inputs,  then  D -  PK  >  0  as  resources  are 
transferred from industry 2 to industry  1. On the other hand, if industry 2 is 
the labor-intensive industry, then D -  PK < 0. That is, 
io 3 PK  as  A,,A;,  S  &,A,,  . 
For  the  case  in  which  industry  2  is  relatively  labor  intensive,  so  that 
-  PK < 0, marginal cost has fallen relative to ATC, requiring output per 
firm  to  rise.  However,  if  industry  2  is  relatively  capital  intensive,  then 
marginal cost has risen relative to ATC, requiring output per firm to fall. 
As a general rule, if an industry’s intensively used factor has a greater share 
in variable cost than in total cost, then a policy that lowers price will also lead 
to rationalization.  On the other hand, if an industry’s intensive factor has a 
smaller share in variable  cost than in total cost, then derationalization  will 
OCCUT.~  It should also be noted that, if technological considerations are leading 
to rationalization of the domestic industry, derationalization will be occurring 
in the foreign industry. 
There are, of course, several demand side considerations that will also help 
determine  firm  output.  An  increase  in  the  absolute  value  of  the  firm’s 
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firm output will therefore rise. To the extent that liberalization increases the 
number of firms in the industry worldwide,  reducing individual firm market 
share,  the second term on the  right-hand  side of equation (3) will  become 
smaller, and the absolute value of the elasticity will therefore rise. 
On  the  other  hand,  as noted  by  Horstmann  and  Markusen  (1986),  ad 
valorem tariff reductions tend to steepen the demand curve facing the foreign 
firm,  lowering the elasticity of demand and lowering output per firm.  This 
point can be  seen by  differentiating equation  (3) with  respect  to  f;,  using 
equation (5). 
7.1.2 
It  is  reasonable  to  presume  that  a  tariff  reduction  on  imports of  the 
monopolistically  competitive good 2 will tend to lower the price received by 
domestic  producers,  P$, relative  to  the  price  paid  for imports,  PT, thus 
worsening the terms of trade for the liberalizing country. The terms of trade 
for the competitive good will also deteriorate. The tariff reduction will shift 
production in the home country toward good 1 and away from good 2. Thus, 
P,/P$  will rise. If the home country is a net exporter of good 2 and an importer 
of good  1, then the increase in P,/P$  constitutes a fall in the price of  exports. 
The tariff reduction  will also shift production in the foreign country toward 
good 2 and away from good  1. Thus, P,/PT will fall. If the home country is 
a net importer of good 2 and an exporter of good  1, then the fall in P,/P? also 
constitutes a deterioration in the home country’s terms of trade. 
The welfare implications of the relative price changes for the home country 
should  nonetheless  be  smaller  than  in  the  more  conventional  Armington 
model, in which goods are differentiated at the national level and individual 
firms are price takers. This will be the case for two reasons. 
First,  the  powerful  terms-of-trade  gain from  a  tariff  in the  NPD  model 
stems from the fact that firms, as price takers, do not internalize the market 
power attendant on national product differentiation. Thus, a tariff that reduces 
national supply to the world market exploits monopoly power ignored by the 
firms. However, if product differentiation exists at the firm level rather than 
at the  national  level,  there  is  little market  power  associated  with  product 
differentiation that  can be perceived by  the  government that is not  already 
exercised by the firm. 
Second, the number of differentiated products in an NPD model equals the 
number of countries.  On the other hand, the number of products in an MC 
model is significantly larger and equal to the sum over the number of firms in 
each country. By increasing the number of products, the market power of the 
seller of  an  individual  product  is  reduced,  leaving  less  room  to  increase 
welfare by reducing supply. 
The terms-of-trade loss of the home country may be further mitigated  if 
rationalization occurs in the foreign country. An increase in output per firm is 
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associated with a reduction in the markup over marginal cost, offsetting some 
of  the original increase in price by foreign firms. 
7.1.3  Increasing Returns to Scale and National Product Differentiation 
Implementation of the differentiated products model computationally does 
not  require national  product  differentiation.  Nonetheless,  the  tendency  has 
been  to  preserve  both  national  and  firm  product  differentiation.  In  this 
context, a third level is added to the utility function. Expenditure on imports 
is  allocated  among  competing  sources  following  the  decision  concerning 
allocation  between  an  import  aggregate  and  a  domestic  aggregate.  For 
example,  Wigle  (1988) adopts  this  approach  and  finds  that  bilateral  tariff 
removal would reduce welfare in Canada by 0.1 percent of GDP. 
National product differentiation is not necessary to explain cross-hauling in 
models with firm product differentiation. It may nonetheless seem plausible to 
retain a preference for the domestically produced good in the utility function. 
However, if perfect aggregation is used to form separate domestic and import 
aggregates, then domestic firms are insulated from changes in the composition 
of  the import aggregate with the consequence of introducing a new equili- 
brating mechanism that has questionable economic content. 
Adding a third stage to the budgeting process will have three implications 
for the computational results. First, the model will be predisposed toward the 
conclusion that free trade will stimulate intraindustry trade, thus minimizing 
the necessary intersectoral adjustment. To  see this point, consider the extreme 
case in which consumers distinguish between the  import and  the  domestic 
variety  of  good  j, Dj,  but  all  firms  within  a  country  produce  perfect 
substitutes. That is, 
Dj  = [(D,")" + (O;")P]~/P, 
where the domestic variety, D,",  and the imported variety, D;", are given by 
i=  I 
and 
i=  1 
where ndf  is the number of domestic firms, nmj is the number of foreign firms 
in  industry j, and Xi  denotes  the  output  of  the  ith  firm.  This is the  case 
analyzed by  Horstmann  and  Markusen  (1986).5  A  key  assumption  in  this 
framework is that the number of firms in the domestic industry does not affect 
demand facing an individual foreign firm, nor does the number of firms in the 
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A tariff  on  imports will  stimulate demand for the domestic variety  and 
reduce demand for the foreign variety, leaving domestic firms with positive 
profits  and  foreign firms  with  negative profits.  To  restore the  zero-profit 
condition, entry occurs domestically while foreign firms exit. Since domestic 
firm demand does not depend on the number of  foreign firms, entry in the 
domestic industry reduces individual firm demand until profits are once again 
zero.  The  opposite  occurs  for  foreign  firms.  The  essential  equilibrating 
mechanism here is that local entry dissipates positive profits by dividing the 
market among a larger number of  firms, thereby reducing firm  output and 
raising average fixed cost. Indeed, Horstmann and Markusen conclude that the 
tariff change has no effect on domestic firm output.6 
In  comparison, consider the model outlined above,  in  which consumers 
distinguish between the output of different firms but not between imports and 
the domestic good. In this case, the level of  firm demand depends not  on 
whether there is local entry or exit but rather on whether there is global entry 
or exit. If the increase in the number of domestic firms is smaller than the fall 
in the number of  foreign firms, then all firms in the industry, both domestic 
and foreign, will experience an increase in  demand.  As a result,  positive 
profits for domestic firms will increase even further. 
Entry in the domestic industry restores the zero-profit condition by raising 
the return to the factor used intensively in the expanding sector, which raises 
total cost. The effect of  local entry on firm demand,  which occurs in  the 
Horstmann-Markusen model, is absent here. Thus, restoring the zero-profit 
condition depends entirely on intersectoral factor movements. 
The second implication of  adding a third stage to the budgeting process is 
that reducing the change in factor prices necessary to restore equilibrium will 
also weaken the forces leading to rationalization or derationalization associ- 
ated with differing factor intensities. The third implication is that reintroduc- 
ing national product differentiation increases national market power that is not 
perceived by  firms, thus raising the optimal tariff. 
7.1.4  Summary 
There are a few lessons that we can draw in comparing the likely welfare and 
trade  conclusions  of  each  approach  for  a  U.S.-Canada  bilateral  tariff 
elimination that  will  be  relevant  for  the  computational results  presented 
below. Welfare conclusions from a model assuming perfect competition and 
national product differentiation will be dominated by  changes in the terms of 
trade. The average level of  tariffs currently in place in Canada is somewhat 
higher than in the United States. This implies that tariff elimination will tend 
to worsen Canada’s terms of trade, resulting in a welfare loss. In addition, the 
intersectoral trade pattern will not be particularly affected by tariff liberaliza- 
tion. Rather, increased trade will be primarily intraindustry. 
In  contrast,  if  industries are monopolistically competitive, then  product 
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associated with product differentation into their pricing decisions. Therefore, 
welfare-reducing changes in the terms of trade as the result of liberalization 
will  be  confined  primarily  to large countries  and  are  not  likely  to play  a 
dominant role in the welfare conclusions of bilateral tariff  removal. Conse- 
quently, welfare gains for Canada are more likely than in the NPD model. 
Further, more distinctive changes in the intersectoral pattern of specialization 
will emerge in view of the fact that each variety of a good is not nationally 
specific.  Production  can  be  relocated  in  the  country  where  the  cost  of 
production is lowest. 
Rationalization  of  the  production  process  will  depend  on  the  general 
equilibrium effects of tariff  liberalization  on the return to capital, which  in 
turn  depends on the  relative  factor-intensity  ranking  of  industries.  If  the 
protected sector is labor intensive and liberalization therefore causes the return 
to capital to rise, output per fin  will tend to rise. However, if the protected 
sector  is  capital  intensive,  then  the  return  to  capital  is  likely  to  fall. 
Consequently, firm output may fall as well. 
7.2  A Market Segmentation Model 
Another alternative to modeling bilateral tariff elimination is to assume that 
all firms sell a homogeneous product but that national markets are segmented. 
Thus, all firms selling to a single national market must charge the same price, 
but  price  may  vary  across  countries.  This  approach  has  not  been  used 
previously in the context of U.S.-Canada bilateral tariff removal but has been 
applied to the European Community by Smith and Venables (1988). Here we 
extend the model of  Venables (1985) to three countries. 
The market demand in country j is 
D,  = Sj(D -  p,),  j  = 1, 2, 3, 
where pj is the price paid  by consumers in country j and S,  is a parameter 
indicating  the  size of  market j.  Firms are assumed  to behave  as Cournot 
followers, so that the perceived demand is the market demand net of  supply 
by other firms. Therefore, a typical firm in country i perceives the demand for 
its exports to country j to be 
x!  = Sj(D -  p,) -  Q,,  j#i 
where Q, is supply by other firms, and demand in the local market to be 
As above, each firm in country  i faces a fixed cost,J;, and constant marginal 
cost, ci, yielding profits of 
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where  5 is  the  tariff  imposed  by  country j on  imports.  The  first-order 
conditions for profit maximization are 
(16)  xj  = S,(pj -  ci - t,)  i#j 
and 
(17) 
Free entry guarantees that profits will be zero, which, when making use of the 
first-order conditions for profit maximization, equations (16) and (17), implies 
that 
(18) 
y; = S;(p; - c;) 
2  (p, - c; -  t,,’Sj  + (p; -  C;)ZS,  -  fi = 0. 
j#i 
Consider now the effect of  a tariff change by country 2 on imports from 
country  1. Totally differentiating equation (18) for each i yields 
Solving for the equilibrium price changes yields 
where A  = y,(y2y3 -  x$$)  -  x:(y3x; -  X~X;) -  x:(yzx: -  xix:). 
If A is positive7 and ci < cj + ti, then it can be shown that dp,/dt,  >O.  The 
restriction on marginal cost implies that a typical domestic firm sells more to 
the domestic market than a typical foreign firm. In this case, the tariff imposed 
by country  2 raises the price paid by consumers in country  1, thus lowering 
welfare  in  country  1. If,  in  addition,  y3x;  >  x$$,  then  it  follows  that 
dp2/dtz < 0. The tariff lowers the price to consumers in country 2,  raising 
welfare in country  2.8 
The effect of a tariff imposed by country 2  in this model  is to lower the 
price net of tariff that country  1 firms receive for their exports to country 2. 
In  order to restore the  zero-profit  condition,  country  1  firms must  increase 
price in other markets,  such as the domestic.  However, the higher price in 
country  1’s market  raises  profitability  for  country  2  firms,  leading  to  a 
reduction  in  price  on sales to  domestic  consumers.  The price  increase  to 
country  1 consumers lowers welfare in country  1, and the price reduction in 
country 2 raises consumer welfare in country 2. 
This outcome, of course, is not inevitable. Negative profits for country  1 
firms are eliminated by raising the price in countries in which country  1 firms 
have a relatively  large market share. The change in relative price, then, will 
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In the U.S.-Canada case, the volume of trade between the United States and 
Canada is  large, while trade  between  Canada and  the rest  of  the  world  is 
comparatively small. A tariff reduction by Canada will raise the profitability 
of U.S. firms. A price reduction  in the United States that lowers profits  of 
U.S. firms and a price increase in Canada and the rest of the world that offsets 
the price reduction in the U.S. market are likely. 
7.3  The Computational Model 
Sections 7.1  and 7.2 leave us with  a set of  propositions  concerning the 
implications of  modeling  choices  that  we would like to illustrate  computa- 
tionally. There are three variants of  the model. The perfect competition (PC) 
version is characterized by national product differentiation,  perfect competi- 
tion,  and  constant  returns  to  scale.  The monopolistic  competition  (MC) 
version differs in that product differentiation exists only at the firm level, there 
are increasing returns to scale, and firms set price as a markup over marginal 
cost. In the market segmentation (MS) version,  there are economies of scale 
as well, but each product is homogeneous across firms and countries. Firms 
behave as Cournot followers and perceive national markets as segmented.’ 
Canada, the United States, and a group of thirty-two other countries  are 
modeled explicitly, and the rest of  the world constitutes an abbreviated fourth 
region. Our sectoral coverage includes twenty-two tradable product categories 
based on three-digit ISIC industries and seven nontradable categories based on 
one-digit ISIC industries. lo 
In all three models, consumers initially allocate final demand and producers 
allocate intermediate demand across sectors without regard to the location of 
production.  Bilateral trade flows are identified in the PC model by assuming 
that consumers and producers aggregate the variety produced by each country 
using  a CES aggregation  function. Thus, the  demand in  country  i  for the 
output of  country r’s production of  good j,  conditional on expenditure on the 
aggregate good j,  E,J,  is 
s= 1 
where P;  is the price consumers in i pay for good j produced in country r. This 
price differs from the price received by the seller in country r by any tariffs 
imposed by country  i. 
Bilateral  trade  flows  in  the MC model  are  similarly  identified,  though 
product differentiation exists at the firm level only. Monopolistically compet- 
itive firms set price as a markup over marginal cost according to equation (21, 
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In  the  MS  model,  consumers do not  distinguish  between  the output of 
various  firms  or  countries.  Rather,  firms  perceive  national  markets  as 
segmented. The firm set price and supply in each market to maximize firm 
profits. That is, 
max  2  e(Pb  - MC,) -  FC,,  P/,.  .  .  .  ,pa, 
I=  I 
where MC and FC are marginal and fixed costs and PLj is the price a typical 
firm in country r receives €or sales in country  i.  This price differs from the 
price paid by consumers in country i by any tariffs imposed. Firms behave as 
Cournot followers. Therefore, the firm’s perceived demand, D;, is the market 
demand  in  country  i for good j,  D,,  less  output  by  other  firms,  Q. The 
underlying utility function  determining  industry demand is Cobb-Douglas. 
Under this assumption,  it can be  shown that the  supply to country  i by a 
representative firm in country r is 
The  production  function  in  all  three  models  requires  intermediate  and 
primary  inputs.  Intermediate  inputs  and  a  primary  input  aggregate  are 
employed in fixed proportion to output. The primary input aggregate is a CES 
function  of  capital  and  labor  employed.  Capital  and  labor  demand  are 
determined by minimizing the cost of attaining the level of the primary input 
aggregate required by the upper level of the production function. In addition 
to variable capital and labor inputs, a fixed input of capital is necessary in the 
MC and MS models. 
Capital and labor are mobile between sectors but not countries. The return 
to capital is determined to equate demand to a fixed supply of capital. The 
return to labor is held constant. National income is adjusted to maintain total 
employment at the base level. 
Freedom of  entry is assumed, and, therefore, firm profits are zero. This 
implies that PC firms must set price equal to marginal cost. MC firms must set 
price equal to ATC, and MS firms must set average price equal to ATC. 
Equilibrium prices are determined in global markets to equate supply and 
demand. In the PC model, one price is determined for each national variety 
of  each  good.  In  the  MC model, one price  is  determined for each  firm. 
However, firms within each country face identical costs and technology, and 
demand is  symmetric.  Therefore,  all firms within  an industry and country 
charge the same price. In the MS model, one price is determined for each 
national market.  Thus, all firms selling in a single market must charge the 
same price. 
The base year for data on production, employment, and trade for the United 
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Input-output  coefficients  for the production  function were derived from the 
U.S. input-output table for 1972 and the Canadian table for 1976. 
The key parameters in the base period for the MC model are obtained in the 
following  manner.”  The  firm’s  perceived  demand  in  the  base  period  is 
calculated according to equation (3), assuming that the elasticity of  substitu- 
tion among varieties of each good is  15.0. 
Once  the  elasticity  of  demand  is  determined,  it  is  straightforward  to 
calculate the variable input share of total cost. The variable cost share is equal 
to the ratio of  marginal cost and average total cost,  Ovc  = MC/ATC. Since 
profits are zero, average total cost is equal to price. The ratio of marginal cost 
and  price  is  determined  by  the  markup  pricing  rule  in  equation  (2). 
Therefore,  Ovc  = 1 + l/q. 
The share of total capital that is variable  is implied by the  variable  cost 
share, capital’s primary input cost share,  BK, and the primary input share of 
total cost, b,.  Capital is assumed to be the only fixed factor. Therefore,  the 
share of capital that is fixed is equal to the ratio of fixed cost’s share of total 
cost to capital’s share of  total cost. That is, 
PKKF/TC  -  KF 
-  ~-  -  1 - 0vc 
OKbO  PK(KF + Kq/TC  KF + Kv 
The distribution of primary input cost between capital and labor is available 
from industry data, and primary  input share of total cost is obtainable from 
input-output  data. 
The relation between fixed capital’s share of total capital and the elasticity 
of substitution in the aggregation function places restrictions on the size of the 
elasticity of substitution. A small value for u  can imply a fixed capital share 
that does not lie between zero and one. Setting u = 15 was the smallest value 
for this parameter consistent with the restrictions on the fixed capital share. 
Structural equations of the MS model also imply base period values for the 
parameters. The markup over marginal cost, (P -  MC)/MC, for each of the 
three national markets is derived from equation (22) to be 
where Mi is the markup over marginal cost by producers in country r on their 
sales to country  i and 0;  is country r’s share of the market in country i. 
This procedure tended to lead to very small markups for many industries, 
which caused instability in the computational model. Therefore, the markups 
are  bounded  from below  by  5 percent.  Utility  functions  other than  Cobb- 
Douglas may produce larger markups. However, it may also be the case that 
this model is unsuitable for modeling sectors that are not highly concentrated. 
The variable cost share for the MS model can be obtained  in  a manner 
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equal to the ratio of marginal cost to average cost. The zero-profit condition 
implies that the average price received by the firm for its sales in each market 
must equal ATC. Therefore, 
where 8; is the share of country r's output that is sold to country i. Equation 
(22) can be used to find that 
7.4  Computational Results of  US.-Canada Bilateral 
Tariff Elimination 
The models described in section 7.3 have been used to analyze computa- 
tionally the effects of bilateral tariff removal by the United States and Canada. 
Our purpose here is to illustrate the implications of various modeling choices 
for the trade and welfare conclusions of  U.S  .-Canada bilateral tariff removal. 
The model was run three times, employing each of the three different market 
structures in  all  industries: perfect competition,  monopolistic competition, 
and market segmentation. It is of course more plausible to assume that market 
structure will  vary  across industries.  Results reflecting  our best judgment 
concerning the proper  market  structure for each  industry can  be  found  in 
Brown and Stem (1989). 
Tariffs removed are those prevailing in both countries subsequent to full 
implementation of the Tokyo Round tariff reductions, which was completed in 
1987. The last column of each of tables 7.2 and 7.3 below list the bilateral 
trade weighted ad valorem tariff equivalents on U.S.-Canada  trade. Notice 
that  U.S. tariffs on  Canadian exports  are somewhat lower than  Canadian 
tariffs on the United States. Nevertheless, U.S.  tariffs on Canadian exports on 
some products such as clothing and footwear remain quite high. 
The results for imports, exports, the exchange rate, terms of  trade,  and 
welfare are summarized in table 7.1. Panel A of table 7.1 reports the change 
in  trade  and  welfare under perfect competition.  U.S.  and  Canadian  trade 
increases by  close to $7 billion, while rest-of-world trade falls by  nearly $2 
billion. The welfare and terms-of-trade changes are similar to those obtained 
elsewhere using such a model,12 and the role of  national product differenti- 
ation is clearly evident. The comparatively deep tariff reductions by  Canada 
worsen its terms of trade by 0.7 percent, leading to a trivial decline in welfare. 
U.  S . terms of trade, on the other hand, improve by 0.3 percent, raising U .  S . 
welfare by  $781 million on the basis of  1976 trade. Rest-of-world welfare 
declines as well. 232  Drusilla K. Brown/Robert M. Stern 
Table 7.1  Summary Results of a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area: Changes in Country 
Imports, Exports, Exchange Rates, Terms of Trade, and Welfare (trade 
and welfare in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Exchange  Terms-of-Trade  Equivalent 
Country  Imports"  Exports"  Rateb  Percentage Change  Variation 
A. Perfect Competition: National Product Differentiation: 
United States  6,981.3  6,643.4  .o 
Other  -1,758.1  -1,611.2  .2 
Canada  6,254.8  6,546.8  .6 
B. Monopolistic Competition: Firm Product Differentiation: 
United States  9,194.2  9,051.7  .o 
Other  -  1,882.1  -  1,762.7  .I 
Canada  9,366.3  9,557.0  -  1.0 
United States  12,947.9  12,624.5  -  .o 
Other  -  1,547.3  -  1,620.2  -  .o 
Canada  10,668.0  10,754.2  .0 
United States  14,689.2  14,372.4  -  .0 
Other  -2,991.2  -2,871.0  .2 
Canada  13,190.4  13,462.4  .6 
United States  19,107.9  19,024.4  .o 
Other  -3,181.4  -3,101  .O  .o 
Canada  18,875  .5  18,890.3  -  1.4 
C. Market Segmentation Model: Homogeneous Products: 
D. Sensitivity Analysis: Perfect Competition:' 
E. Sensitivity Analysis: Monopolistic Competition:' 
.3 
-.l 
-  .7 
.1 
-.l 
-  .5 
.2 
-.I 
-  .3 
.2 
-.I 
-  .7 
.1 
-  .0 
-  .3 
780.9 






-  240.0 
-  1,389.1 
657. I 
-267.8 
-  163.9 
-  1,002.8 
-55.9 
2,797.2 
"Dollar value of change in trade volume. 
b( +)  indicates depreciation of  currency. 
'Elasticity  of substitution between varieties increased above base run. 
The  outcome  is  somewhat  different  if  industry  structure  is  taken  to  be 
monopolistically competitive. These results are presented in panel B of table 
7.1.  U.S.  and  Canadian  trade  increases  by  about  $9  billion.  The  U.S. 
terms-of-trade gain is now only one-third as large (0.1 percent), and Canada's 
terms-of-trade loss is about 30 percent smaller ( -  0.5 percent).  This result 
was expected. The move from products differentiated at the national level to 
products differentiated at the firm level significantly increases the number of 
products,  thereby  increasing  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  each  individual 
variety. In addition, rationalization occurs in the United States as a result of 
liberalization, forcing U.S. firms to reduce the markup over marginal cost. 
The U.S. welfare gain is accordingly reduced to $476 million, but Canada's 
welfare gain rises to $2.3 billion, which is  1.2 percent of Canadian GDP in 
1976. There are several possible explanations for the welfare improvement for 
Canada. First, a smaller deterioration in Canada's terms of trade will reduce 
the welfare loss. Second, as discussed above, internalizing market power by 
differentiating products at the firm  level, rather than at the national  level, 
lowers Canada's optimal tariff. Thus, despite the deterioration in the terms of 233  US.-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination 
trade, Canadian welfare still rises owing to efficiency gains. Third, Canada 
may be gaining from rationalizing production. 
In  order to  illustrate  the  sensitivity  of  the  model  to  the  choice  of  the 
elasticity of  substitution, the PC and MC versions of the model  were rerun 
after increasing the elasticity of substitution. Values for this parameter ranged 
from seventeen to forty-five across industries, compared to fifteen in the base 
run. These results are summarized in panels D and E of  table 7.1. 
In the case of perfect competition, the most notable effect of increasing the 
elasticity of substitution is to increase the change in the volume of trade. The 
effects on the  terms  of  trade  and welfare  are trivial.  This is not  the  case, 
however,  if  firms  are  monopolistically  competitive.  The  terms-of-trade 
changes are further  weakened  as the elasticity of  substitution increases.  In 
particular,  Canada’s  terms  of  trade  deteriorate  by  only  0.3 percent,  as 
compared  to 0.5  percent  in  the  base  run  and  0.7  percent  under  national 
product differentiation. Canada’s welfare gain rises to 1.4 percent  of  GDP. 
Panel C of  table 7.1 summarizes the  effects of  liberalization  in  the  MS 
model. The trade effect is significantly larger than for the other two market 
structures,  with  U.S.  and  Canadian  trade  increasing  by  about  $11-$13 
billion.  The terms-of-trade effects are similar to those obtained in the MC 
model, but welfare for all three country groups declines. It should be noted at 
the  outset that  the  MS  model  is a poor  approximation  of  firm behavior in 
unconcentrated  industries.  Result;  presented  for this  version  of  the  model 
should  therefore  be  considered  illustrative  only.  Little  weight  should  be 
attached accordingly to the aggregate measures such as the terms of trade and 
welfare. 
7.4.1  Sectoral Results: Perfect Competition and Monopolistic 
Competition 
Sectoral results for each experiment are presented in tables 7.2-7.7.  Tables 
7.2 and 7.3 report the percentage change in exports, imports, bilateral trade, 
output, capital employment, the return to capital, and labor employment due 
to bilateral liberalization under perfect competition for the United States and 
Canada, respectively.  Tables 7.4 and  7.5 report similar values  for the  MC 
model.  The percentage  changes  in  the  number  of  firms  and  in  the  firm’s 
perceived  elasticity of demand are also included. 
The most notable feature of  the PC model is the strong tendency toward 
increased  intraindustry  trade.  Bilateral  trade  increases  in  virtually  every 
sector.  The  only  exception  is  that  Canadian  imports  of  transportation 
equipment from the United  States fall by  3.2 percent.  Total trade  for both 
countries generally increases as well. U.S. imports increase in every sector, 
and Canada’s imports decline only in petroleum products and transportation 
equipment. 
Employment effects are equally small. The largest decline in employment 
in the United  States is  1.3 percent  in nonferrous metals.  Significantly  more Table 7.2  Sectoral Effects on the United States of US.-Canada Free Trade, Tariffs Only, Post-Tokyo  Round: 
Perfect Competition (percentage change) 
Imports from: 
Tariff on 
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.9 Table 7.3  Sectoral Effects on Canada of US.-Canada Free Trade, Tariffs Only, Post-Tokyo  Round: 
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5.0 Table 7.4  Sectoral Effects on the United States of  US.-Canada  Free Trade, Tariffs Only, Post-Tokyo  Round: 
Monopolistic Competition (percentage change) 
Imports from:  No. of  Firms 
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.4  3.2  17.7 
8.8  5.7  50.5 
52.1  1.9  234.2 
2.7  5.8  12.2 
84.1  1.9  131.6 
6.6  -5.8  -9.2 
85.9  24.5  63.4 
19.4  -21.3  -23.3 
11.6  -.2  -6.7 
19.6  -11.5  -48.3 
1.6  -1.0  -12.0 
27.6  12.4  63.8 
32.6  10.6  57.9 
9.3  7.8  63.8 
5.2  28.4  76.9 
30.6  9.8  52.6 
7.4  5.8  22.6 
15.9  2.5  60.1 
11.0  44.6  96.0 
10.0  -.3  -1.3 
43.7  -1.0  72.0 
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-.l Table 1.5  Sectoral Effects on Canada of U.S.-Canada Free Trade, Tariffs Only, Post-Tokyo  Round: 
Monopolistic Competition (percentage change) 
Sector 
Imports from:  No. of Finns 
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labor adjustment is required in Canada. For example, employment in textiles 
falls by  25.0 percent. 
In  comparison,  the  interindustry effect  of  liberalization is  much  more 
pronounced under monopolistic competition. While liberalization causes U. S. 
imports from Canada to rise in every sector in the PC  model, U.S. imports 
from Canada in the MC model fall in wood products ( -  9.2 percent), paper 
products (- 23.3 percent), printing and publishing ( -  6.7 percent), chemicals 
(-48.3  percent), petroleum products (- 12.0 percent), nonmetallic mineral 
products (- 8.9 percent), and miscellaneous manufactures (- 1.3 percent). 
Interindustry specialization in production, particularly for Canada, follows 
a similar pattern. Under the MC model, output in Canada declines in sixteen 
of  the twenty-two tradable sectors, as compared to eight sectors that decline 
in the PC model. The expanding sectors are leather products (37.2 percent), 
footwear (2.8 percent), rubber products (18.7 percent), iron and steel (27.4 
percent),  nonferrous metals  (68.1  percent),  and  transportation  equipment 
(85.1 percent). On the other hand, U.S. output declines in  several of  these 
sectors,  such as  leather products  (-0.5  percent),  rubber products (-0.7 
percent), iron and steel (- 1.6 percent), nonferrous metals (-6.5  percent), 
and transportation equipment ( -  7.6 percent). 
The degree to which firms rationalize or derationalize can be determined by 
comparing industry output to the number of firms. If the percentage change in 
industry output exceeds the percentage change in the number of  firms, then 
output per firm must have risen. In the case of the United States, rationaliza- 
tion  occurs  in  every  sector  except  miscellaneous  manufactures.  In  that 
industry, output rises by 2.0 percent, but the number of firms increases by 2.3 
percent. 
This is  not  a particularly surprising result.  The return  to  capital in  the 
United States rises by 0.1 percent, causing ATC to increase. Firms return to 
the zero-profit position by  increasing output. 
On  the  demand side,  the reduction  in  Canada’s tariffs was  expected to 
reduce the perceived demand elasticity of  U.S. firms, while the fall in the 
U.S. tariff  should have  raised  the  firm’s perceived elasticity of  demand. 
Overall, the demand elasticity increased, reducing markup overall marginal 
cost and further raising firm output. Miscellaneous manufactures is the only 
industry in  the United  States for  which  the  firm’s  perceived elasticity of 
demand falls.  The increased market power attendant to a fall  in elasticity 
induces profit-maximizing firms to reduce output and increase the markup of 
price over marginal cost. Thus, as noted above, output per firm in the industry 
also falls. 
Rationalization effects for Canada are mixed. The comparatively deep tariff 
reductions by  Canada would have been expected to increase the elasticity of 
demand and increase firm output. However, the return to capital fell in Canada 
by  I.  1 percent, which tends to lower firm output. Rationalization occurred in 
fifteen of  the twenty-two tradable industries in Canada, but derationalization 
occurred in all the nontradable industries. 239  US-Canada Bilateral  Tariff Elimination 
The tradable industries in which firm output declined are agriculture, wood 
products, paper products, printing and publishing, chemicals, and nonmetallic 
mineral products. These tend to be the industries in which Canadian tariffs are 
already quite low. (Canadian average tariffs on U.S. exports are 2.2 percent 
on  agricultural products,  2.5 percent  on  wood  products,  1.1  percent  on 
printing and pubishing, and 4.4 percent on nonmetallic mineral products.) 
Consequently, tariff reductions did little to increase the perceived elasticity of 
demand of  Canadian firms. 
We  conclude, then, that the relatively large increase in welfare for Canada 
may in part be due to realized economies of scale. However, the U.S. welfare 
gain  is  distinctly  smaller even  though  rationalization occurs  much  more 
consistently across all U.S.  industries. Therefore, it is likely that intersectoral 
specialization is playing an important role as well. 
7.4.2  Sector Results: Market Segmentation 
Sectoral results for U.S.-Canada bilateral tariff removal in  the MS model 
are presented in table 7.6  for the United States and table 7.7 for Canada. The 
special characteristics of  the  MS  model  are  most  readily  apparent when 
examining  the  production  and  price  changes  in  the  United  States.  The 
reduction  in Canadian  tariffs on  U.S. exports  raises  the  after-tariff price 
received  by  U.S.  exporters,  thus  increasing firm  profits.  The  zero-profit 
condition  is restored  by  a reduction  in  the price received for  sales to the 
domestic market. As can be seen from column 7 of table 7.6, the price paid 
by U.S. consumers for tradable goods generally declines. The only exceptions 
are leather products, iron and steel, and transportation equipment. 
In addition, entry occurs in most U.S.  industries. The number of U.S. firms 
declines only in leather products (-42.2  percent), petroleum products (-4.4 
percent), rubber products (-0.4  percent),  iron  and  steel (- 1.8 percent), 
metal products ( -  0.1 percent), and transportation equipment ( -  18.0 per- 
cent). 
The tariff reductions by  the United States increase the profits of Canadian 
firms as well. However, the adjustment is dominated by intersectoral resource 
shifts. Interestingly, sectoral specialization in Canada in the MS model occurs 
in  many  of  the  same industries as  in  the  MC  model.  Output in  Canada 
increases in only six tradable sectors: leather products, footwear, petroleum 
products, rubber products, nonelectrical machinery, and transport equipment. 
Owing to  increased  specialization in  Canada,  U.S.  imports  from  Canada 
decline in  several sectors, such as wood  products (- 17.2 percent), paper 
products ( -  43.1 percent), printing and publishing ( -  6.0  percent), chemicals 
(-62.9  percent), nonmetallic mineral products (- 5.1 percent), nonferrous 
metals (- 185.9 percent), and miscellaneous manufactures (- 68.1 percent). 
On the other hand, Canada’s imports from the United States increase in all 
categories except leather products ( -  73.2 percent) and transportation equip- 
ment ( -  42.2 percent). Table 7.6  Sectoral Effects on the United States of U.S.-Canada Free Trade, Tariffs Only, Post-Tokyo  Round: 
Market Segmentation (percentage change) 
Imports from: 
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Exit accompanies  the decline in output in most Canadian industries.  The 
number  of  Canadian  firms  increases  only  in  leather  products  (1,094.5 
percent), footwear (15.6 percent), petroleum products (72.0 percent), rubber 
products (14.0 percent),  nonelectrical  machineray  (2.5 percent),  and trans- 
portation equipment (153.3 percent). 
Though the  MS and  MC models  yield  similar intersectoral  results,  they 
differ in one important  respect. Rationalization  is much more prevalent  for 
Canadian firms and much less prevalent for U.S. firms in the MS model than 
in the MC model.  A comparison of  the percentage change in industry output 
and number of firms in Canada shows that output per firm rises in sixteen of 
the twenty-two tradable sectors. This result is similar to that obtained with the 
MC  model.  However,  rationalization  also  occurs  in  five  of  the  seven 
nontradable  sectors, whereas  all  the  nontradable  Canadian industries  dera- 
tionalized in the MC model. 
In  the  United  States, derationalization  occurs in  furniture  and  fixtures, 
petroleum  products,  rubber  products, nonmetallic  mineral products,  glass 
products,  iron  and  steel,  metal  products,  nonelectrical  machinery,  and 
electrical machinery. In comparison, all U.S.  industries increase output per 
firm in the MC model, except miscellaneous manufactures.  In the nontradable 
industries,  six of seven sectors derationalize in the MS model, compared to 
none in the MC model. 
The relative return to capital in Canada increases by  1.3 percent, raising 
firm fixed costs. In order to maintain zero profits, firm output in Canada tends 
to rise.  The return to capital  in the U.S.  increases as well,  but  by a much 
smaller 0.1 percent. This result suggests that the rationalization effects in the 
model may be quite sensitive to the method used for calculating the variable 
cost  share,  though  demand  side  considerations  are  also  affecting  firm 
behavior. 
7.5  Summary and Conclusions 
Our purpose in this paper has been to review the important modeling issues 
involved in analyzing the economic effects of bilateral tariff removal between 
the United States and Canada. The major modeling issues identified include 
(1) improving modeling techniques for identifying the bilateral trade that will 
be subject to tariff  removal, (2)  whether  liberalization  would  lead firms to 
increase output and capture scale economies in production, (3) whether the 
gains  from  the  agreement  would  stem  from  increased  intraindustry  or 
interindustry trade, and (4) whether terms-of-trade effects or efficiency gains 
would dominate the welfare outcome of liberalization. 
Three classes  of  models  were identified  as suitable  for studying bilateral 
tariff removal.  These are models in which products are differentiated  at the 
national level, models in which products are differentiated  at the firm level, 
and models in which markets are segmented at the national level. 243  U  .S .-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination 
In all three cases, markets may be imperfectly competitive as the result of 
increasing returns to scale in production. Reaping economies of scale provides 
an  additional  source of  potential  gain  from  trade  liberalization,  which  is 
thought to be especially important in the Canadian case because of the small 
size of  its national market. The determination  of the scale of production  for 
each  firm  in  an  MC market  was  shown  theoretically  to  depend  on  the 
factor-intensity ranking of the industries most heavily protected. If liberaliza- 
tion raises the return to capital, thereby increasing ATC relative to marginal 
cost,  firm  output  must  rise  to satisfy  the  zero-profit  and  maximum-profit 
conditions.  The opposite occurs if  the return  to capital falls.  Though the 
power  of  rationalization  effects may  depend on country size, the direction 
does not. 
Previous studies of the U.S.-Canada FTA have exhibited a strong tendency 
toward the conclusions  that  increased  trade will be primarily  intraindustry, 
that rationalization will occur in most Canadian industries, but that Canada’s 
terms of trade will deteriorate. These results where shown in section 7.1 to be 
influenced by the assumption of  national product differentiation. In particular, 
national product differentiation and strong terms-of-trade effects appear to lie 
behind most negative welfare conclusions found for Canada. 
Differentiating products by place of production is a convenient and popular 
procedure for identifying bilateral trade flows. However, the development of 
computational models with imperfectly competitive firms offers an attractive 
alternative. We have not provided empirical evidence that product differenti- 
ation  is  more  likely  to exist at  the  firm  level  than  at  the  national  level. 
However,  given  the  artificial  nature  of  the assumption  of  national  product 
differentiation and its strong welfare,  trade, and terms-of-trade  implications, 
it should be used sparingly and only on the condition that this assumption is 
convincingly justified in each case. This is especially the case in view of  the 
fact  that  differentiating  products  at  the  firm  level  sidesteps  many  of  the 
problems associated with differentiation at the national level. 
The theoretical results were illustrated using a general equilibrium compu- 
tational  model. Three market  structures  were  adopted:  perfect  competition 
with  national  product  differentiation;  monopolistic  competition  with  firm 
product  differentiation;  and  a  national  market  segmentation  model  with 
homogeneous products. 
The computational  results  from the  MC model  without national  product 
differentiation indicate that rationalization depends on the change in the return 
to capital, with  the United  States more likely  to experience rationalization 
than  Canada.  Strong  interindustry  specialization  occurs,  particularly  in 
Canada, with output in Canada declining in sixteen of the twenty-two tradable 
sectors and exports declining in eight tradable sectors.  Intersectoral special- 
ization gains are in part responsible for an increase in Canadian welfare by 1.2 
percent of GDP, despite the deterioration in Canada’s terms of trade. The U.S. 
welfare gain is also positive but smaller in absolute terms. 244  Drusilla K. BrownlRobert M. Stern 
Notes 
1.  The Armington assumptions are that the utility function is weakly separable in 
goods  and  that  the  function  used  to  aggregate  the  import  and  the  domestically 
produced good is linearly homogeneous. That is, the utility function can be written as 
a function of  the n goods, U = U(X,, .  .  , ,XJ,  and each good is an aggregate of the 
domestic and imported varieties, Xi  = f(X7,  Xy).  These are simply the assumptions 
necessary for perfect aggregation as demonstrated by  Green (1964). 
2.  National product differentiation  and  the terms of  trade  effects of  a tariff  are 
discussed in detail in Hamilton and Whalley (1983) and Brown (1987). 
3. For a summary and analysis of the various studies of the U.S.-Canada  FTA, see 
Brown and Stern (1989). 
4.  Flam and Helpman (1987, p. 87) explore a similar model but cast their results 
somewhat differently. They conclude that the utilization rate in industry 2 depends on 
whether the absolute value of the elasticity of supply of  2 with respect to the price of 
1  is larger  or  smaller  than  the  absolute  value  of  the  elasticity  of  research  and 
development with respect to the price of  1. 
5. Horstmann and Markusen make the additional assumption that there is a single 
factor of  production. 
6.  This strong result depends on two assumptions. First, there is only one factor of 
production.  As  a result,  the  industry can  expand  without  changing  relative  factor 
prices.  This  implies that the  slope of  the  ATC  curve  does  not  change  during  the 
adjustment. Second, the demand for the domestic good is assumed to shift in a parallel 
fashion in response to changes in the price of imports. Thus, the slope of the demand 
curve  is  also unaffected.  Together, these  two assumptions  imply that the  point of 
tangency between the ATC curve and domestic demand will always occur at the same 
level of output. 
7.  Sufficient conditions for A > 0 are that all countries of the  model are identical 
and that all countries impose a positive tariff. This implies that y, = y,, x;  = x$, and 
yi > x;.  An alternative is that yi > x;  + xf and that yi > xj. That is, a typical firm 
sells more domestically than it exports, and a domestic firm sells more to the domestic 
market than a foreign firm. 
8. This condition requires that a country 3 firm’s sales to the domestic market add 
more to profits than exports to country  1 as compared to a typical firm in country 2. 
As a result, an increase in p1  and a fall in p3  that hold country 3 firm profits at zero will 
imply positive profits for country 2 firms. Thus, dp, must be less than zero. 
9.  For the proportionately diffcrcntiated equations of  the model, see the appendix 
to Brown and Stem (1989). 
10. The thirty-two countries are sixteen industrialized countries (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, the Federal Republic of  Germany, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and  the  United  Kingdom)  and  sixteen  newly  industrializing  countries  (Argentina, 
Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Greece,  Hong  Kong,  India,  Israel,  Mexico,  Portugal, 
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia). 
11. Values for these parameters can be obtained from the authors on request. 
12. See Brown and Stem (1987) and Boadway and Treddenick (1978). 245  U.S.-Canada  Bilateral Tariff Elimination 
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COrIlment  Robert W.  Staiger 
I found the paper by Brown and Stem to be extremely interesting. The authors 
consider a timely topic and use the opportunity to produce some suggestive 
numbers on the likely magnitude of the gains from the U.S.-Canada free trade 
agreement  as well  as to  tackle  some important  methodological  issues  in 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling in the presence of  noncom- 
petitive  markets.  The authors compare the  gains from trade  liberalization 
between  the United  States and Canada under three  model  scenarios  corre- 
sponding to three different characterizations of market structure: that markets 
are  competitive  but  the  Armington  assumption  holds,  that  markets  are 
monopolistically competitive, and that markets are segmented. As might be 
expected from the work of Harris (1984), and as the authors illustrate here, 
market structure can have a profound effect on the nature and magnitude of the 
gains from trade liberalization. 
The  results  described  by  the  authors  under  the  three  market  structure 
alternatives are suggestive of the contributions to the overall gains from trade 
liberalization that each kind of  industry will make. Nevertheless, no single 
market structure will characterize all industries,  and the assumption made by 
the authors that all industries are either perfectly  competitive, monopolisti- 
cally competitive, or segmented must be viewed as artificial.  Thus, while I 
find the  quantitative  results  intriguing,  for this  and  other reasons outlined 
below I interpret the main contribution of the paper as methodological rather 
than empirical. 
In this regard, I found the discussion of the monopolistically  competitive 
model most interesting but, at the same time, least transparent. I will therefore 
focus  my  comments on what  I  view  as  the  paper’s  main  methodological 
insight with regard to the monopolistically competitive model: that is, the link 
between protection  and output per firm  in the monopolistically  competitive 
sector,  or the issue  of  “rationalization.”  After  summarizing the  authors’ 
methodological  points, I  will  then comment on their  attempt to implement 
these insights in the CGE modeling experiment of the paper. 
Rationalization 
In my  view, the main  contribution of  the paper involves formalizing  the 
general equilibrium relation between “rationalization’ ’ and changes in factor 
prices that  accompany  a change in  the  level  of  protection  in  a  two-factor 
setting. Here, I will attempt to summarize the main argument. 
The free-entry (symmetric)  equilibrium  conditions for a monopolistically 
competitive industry are given by the profit-maximizing markup equation and 
the free-entry zero-profit condition 
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where firm subscripts can be dropped owing to symmetry and where P, C(-), 
and  C,(.) are  price,  total  cost,  and  marginal  cost,  respectively,  of  the 
monopolistically competitive good, r and w  are rental and wage rates, q is the 
output level of a representative firm in the industry, and q  is the elasticity of 
demand as perceived by  the firm with the sign reversed. Expressions (1) and 
(2) can be  combined to yield 
Under the assumption of  constant marginal costs, (3) can be rewritten as 
(4) 
where w is the wage-to-rental ratio wir. The variable 0(w,  q) is the elasticity 
of cost with respect to output, the inverse of which is used as an index of scale 
economies by  Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
Expression (4) implicitly defines equilibrium output per firm as a function 
of  w and 11, or 
(5)  q  = q(w,  7). 
Totally differentiating (5) with respect to the tariff T yields 
Note from (6) that, if the demand elasticity is unaltered, a change in the level 
of protection will affect the equilibrium level of output for the representative 
firm in the sector only through its effect on the wage-rental ratio w. It is this 
production side link between trade liberalization and rationalization that is in 
my  view the primary methodological contribution of  the paper. 
To focus on this link between changes in protection and output per firm in 
the monopolistically competitive sector, I will assume throughout that demand 
elasticity is held constant. To  see how output per firm varies with  relative 
factor prices when the elasticity of  demand is held constant, totally differen- 
tiate (4)  to get 
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Therefore, with the elasticity of demand held constant, the general equilib- 
rium effect of  a change in the level of protection  on output per firm in the 
monopolistically competitive  sector is given by 
Direct calculation and substitution of equilibrium condition (4) allows (8) to 
be rewritten as 
(9) 
where cp and + are the elasticities of marginal and total cost, respectively, with 
respect to the wage-rental rate. 
With the assumption of constant marginal cost, total cost can be written as 
(10)  C(w, q) = F(w)  + qC,(w,  q), 
where F(o)  is fixed cost for a representative firm. Using (lo), an expression 
for (cp - +) can be derived as 
6F w 
oF 
cp - * = (1 - 049 - F-). 
Hence,  cp - IJ  will  be positive  if  and only if  fixed  costs are more capital 
intensive than variable costs. Expression (9) then implies that, provided this 
factor intensity condition is met, 
(12)  sign(2) =  -sign(%).  do 
In words, abstracting from demand side effects, the monopolistically  com- 
petitive sector will undergo “rationalization” when trade is liberalized if and 
only if liberalization reduces the wage-rental ration in the country. 
Figure  7C.1 illustrates  this  relation.  The variable  0  is measured  on the 
vertical axis, while output is measured on the horizontal axis. The positively 
sloped solid curve measures  0 as a function of output  holding factor prices 
fixed at w,.  This curve will have a positive slope provided we maintain the 
assumption of constant marginal cost. A solid horizontal line has been plotted 
through  1 - l/q, and  its  intersection  with  the  0  curve  determines  the 
equilibrium  output  level  given  factor  prices  o,. Firm  profits  would  be 
negative  if  output  were below  q,,  leading  to exit and a rise  in output per 
remaining firm. Output above qo would result in positive firm profits and a fall 
in output per firm as entry of  new firms occurs. 
An increase in the wage-rental ratio will shift the 0 curve vertically upward 
provided that fixed costs are more capital intensive than variable costs. At the 
original  level  of  output,  firms  now  make  positive  profits  owing  to  the 249  U.S.-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination 
Fig. 7C.1  Rationalization and the wage-rental ratio 
diminished magnitude of  fixed relative to variable costs. This induces entry 
and lowers output per firm. 
The production  side relation  between  liberalization  and rationalization  is 
surprising both in its simplicity and in its apparent generality. Aside from the 
free-entry equilibrium  conditions  for monopolistic  competition, the relation 
requires only that  marginal  costs be constant  and that fixed costs be  more 
capital  intensive  than  variable  costs. Of  course,  as  the  authors point  out, 
demand  side  consideration  also enter,  and  changes in  demand elasticities 
associated with liberalization will factor into the rationalization process. But 
I think the authors have isolated an interesting and potentially important link 
between trade liberalization and rationalization. 
Implementation 
The power  of  the  theoretical  predictions  outlined  above can  be  readily 
appreciated once we turn to implementation. To quantify the bracketed term 
in  the  relation  in  (9), surprisingly  little  information  need  be  gathered. In 
particular,  under  the  assumption  that  capital  is the  only  fixed  factor,  the 
authors require only measures of labor’s primary input cost share, the primary 
input share of  total cost, firm output, and the elasticity of demand faced by 
firms  in  the  monopolistically  competitive  sector.  Data  on  the  first  three 
variables  are readily  available.  However,  data on demand elasticities  are 
difficult  to come by  and  are absolutely  crucial:  demand elasticities  play  a 
central role in the production side relation emphasized by the authors, not to 
mention  the  direct  effect  that  changes in  demand elasticities  will  have  on 
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For this reason, the quality of  the results of the CGE experiments that the 
authors undertake in an attempt to quantify these relations will depend heavily 
on the quality of their estimates of demand elasticities for the monopolistically 
competitive  sectors.  Unfortunately,  the  authors come very  close  to simply 
assuming a value for the demand elasticities of the model with little in the way 
of  discussion  to  support  their  chosen  values.  In  the  light  of  the  central 
importance of the demand elasticities in determining the degree of  rational- 
ization in their model,  this comes close to assuming the quantitative effects 
that  are the focus of  the paper.  As  such, I would  have more confidence in 
drawing general lessons from the CGE modeling results of  this paper if better 
estimates of  the crucial demand elasticities could be found. 
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Comment  John Whalley 
I very much enjoyed this paper by Brown and Stem, which struck me as both 
well  written  and  interesting.  What the  paper  does is to use  three different 
numerical  general equilibrium models to look at tariff cuts between Canada 
and  the  United  States using  1976 data. These are a perfectly  competitive 
model,  a  monopolistically  competitive  model,  and  a  market  segmentation 
model. 
The conclusion  is that the model matters for the evaluation of tariff cuts. 
The early material in the paper gives clear intuition as to how various model 
features interact. For instance, with an assumption of product differentiation 
at the national level plus product differentiation by firm,  it is clear that there 
are small rationalization effects resulting from tariff cuts. In turn, rational- 
ization effects depend most on factor intensity differences across industries. 
I have two points to make about the paper. One concerns the applicability 
of the paper to the recent Canada-U.S. free trade agreement and the other the 
results and implications of  the analysis. 
John Whalley is director for the Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations and 
professor of  economics  at  the  University  of  Western  Ontario.  He  also currently  holds  the 
William G.  Davis chair for international economics and is a research associate of the National 
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First, however, I will present some comments about Canada-U.S. trade and 
the  applicability  of  this  analysis  to  the  current  free  trade  agreement.  The 
Canada-U.S. free trade agreement  is, of course, much  more than the tariff 
cuts that are considered in this paper and, in turn,  apply to 1988 rather than 
1976 tariffs. The agreement has twenty-one  chapters and is longer than the 
whole of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It has complex 
chapters on dispute settlement, energy, investment, agriculture, procurement, 
services, financial services, and standards. As a result, it is important to keep 
in mind that the paper is only tangentially related to the issues that are at the 
heart of the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement. 
Indeed, from the point of view of the Canadians, who were the demanders 
for this  agreement,  the  main  objective  was  security  of  access  rather  than 
improvements in access per se. From the Canadian side, tariffs were not that 
big an issue. In the aggregate, approximately 80 percent of Canadian exports 
are already duty free, although there are remaining spikes in the U.S. tariff 
wall, particularly in the textiles area. Indeed, the tariff reductions are by no 
means complete since in the textile area these are restricted by a tariff quota. 
As a result, when evaluating the agreement, it is important to keep in mind 
that such issues as the security value to Canada from hoped-for improvements 
on dispute settlement applying to countervailing and antidumping duties are in 
no way attacked through this modeling effort. Equally, from a U.S. point of 
view,  the  security  value  of  access  to  Canadian  energy  supplies  is  not 
quantified, nor is the removal of investment restrictions. 
In addition, it is important to keep in mind the nature of Canada-U.S. trade 
and  how  that  also  qualifies  the  analysis  in  this  paper.  A  large  fraction- 
my  impression  is  as  large  as  60-70  percent  of  Canada-U.S.  trade  in 
manufacturers-is  trade that is internal to integrated firms across the border. 
Thus,  much  of  the  analysis  in  the  paper  hinging  on  national  product 
differentiation  no  longer  applies.  In  turn,  around  50 percent  of  Canadian 
exports  to the  United  States are in the  form of  nonmanufactured  exports. 
Also, 30 percent of trade takes place in autos and parts under the coverage of 
the auto pact, again covering vertically integrated firms on both sides of the 
border. Thus, to apply this modeling framework in an overly mechanical way 
to Canada-U.S. trade might be somewhat misleading. 
Also, in analyzing rationalization effects, it seems to me that this paper has 
to confront the Canada-U. S.  productivity differences that were at the heart of 
the earlier Harris analysis. This showed large effects from Canada-U.S. free 
trade,  resulting  from  the  collusive behavior  in  his work. The old  view  in 
Canada, from the 1950s, was that average costs in manufacturing were about 
30 percent higher in Canada than in the United States and that production runs 
were  shorter.  As a result,  there were  more product  lines  per plant.  These 
differentials tended to fall in the  1960s and 1970s as tariffs fell. These were 
the  stylized  facts that  Harris  was  attempting  to deal  with  in  his  work  on 
Canada-U.S.  trade  but  that  in  the  framework  in  which  Brown  and  Stern 
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With  these  comments  about  the  applicability  of  the  modeling  to  both 
current Canada-U.S. trade and the agreement, it is perhaps worth moving on 
to some comments about the results and their implications.  First comes the 
issue of the size and the sign of the welfare effects and how these change as 
model selection changes. In the constant returns-to-scale case, the authors find 
that, owing to an adverse terms-of-trade  effect, Canada loses as a result of 
bilateral tariff elimination. This, in turn, reflects the differential level of initial 
tariffs.  Although  Canada  is  the  smaller  country  and  therefore  might  be 
expected to gain, because they have the higher level of initial protection they 
therefore lose. 
In  the  monopolistically  competitive  model,  they  find,  in  contrast,  that 
Canada gains by about 1.2 percent of GNP. And, in the market structure case, 
although the welfare effects are not emphasized, there is a loss of around 0.6 
percent of  GNP. 
Rather than emphasize only the sign difference, it is important to compare 
these results to those of  other studies, such as Harris. Harris’s earlier models 
produced welfare effects for Canada as large as 10 percent of GNP because of 
large rationalization effects. Harris’s treatment of collusion and implicit limit 
pricing  under  his  treatment  of  the  Eastman-Stykolt  hypothesis  has  been 
discussed at some length in the literature. But the point to keep in mind is that 
the variation in results among the model approaches used by Brown and Stem 
is small compared to the larger differences relative to Harris. 
Second, there is an issue of  whether the authors’ results are more parameter 
dependent than structure dependent. For instance, perceived elasticities in the 
monopolistically competitive model are not endogenous, nor are the markup 
rates.  There are sensitivity analyses in the paper, and these indicate limited 
sensitivity  of  findings,  but  the  question  as  to  parameter  or  structural 
dependence remains as central in evaluating their results. 
Third are some issues as to the plausibility of some of  the detailed industry 
results in their analysis. For instance, in their table 7.5, there is an 85 percent 
increase in the output of transport  equipment in Canada as a result of joint 
elimination of  tariffs.  This occurs even though  there  is free trade  between 
Canada and the United States under the auto pact and is, therefore, somewhat 
doubtful. Also, there is a 32 percent reduction in output of textiles in Canada. 
It has long been held to be the case in Canada that the textile industry would 
be  one  of  the  main  beneficiaries  of  a  comprehensive Canada-U.S.  trade 
agreement because of the improved access to the large U.S. market behind the 
quota wall against all developing countries through the multifiber arrangement 
provisions. Thus, a 32 percent reduction in output of textiles in Canada when 
the  U.S.  industry  has  fought  so hard  to maintain  tariff  protection  against 
Canadian textiles in the actual negotiations seems somewhat implausible. 
Fourth,  there  are  some  features  of  the  model  that  are perhaps  a  little 
misleading.  The entry assumptions  are perhaps inadequately defended. The 253  U.S  .-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination 
implication seems to be that all firms in the monopolistically competitive case 
are of equal size. This is too strong since a typical structure is to have a small 
number of large firms and a larger number of small firms. 
There are also issues  concerning  the  modeling  of  Canada-U.S.  barriers 
themselves and how they are to be interpreted vis- &,is  price dispersion data. 
My understanding, for instance, is that there are data in Europe that show that 
as part of the current integration exercise in Europe there is more dispersion 
among prices in national domestic markets in products where it is known that 
there are no significant  country barriers than in those products  where major 
barriers exist. This suggests that it may well be differences in market structure 
across the two borders that are more important than price differentials induced 
by restrictions. 
In the final analysis, the question that I ask myself is whether this analysis 
has convinced me of major propositions that are important for the analysis of 
Canada-U.S.  trade.  The major contribution  clearly  lies  in the insights  the 
paper has generated rather than the precise results. Market structure makes a 
difference  for  the  welfare  analysis  of  trade  policy.  We  can  build  many 
different  models  with  different  results.  Unfortunately,  however,  there  are 
other potential market structures that have not been taken into account in this 
analysis. Also, it is not obvious that one necessarily wants the same market 
structure for all industries, and the results are always parameter dependent- 
markups,  the  treatment  of  scale economies,  and  perceived  elasticities  all 
matter. Brown and Stem have given us an excellent paper, one that takes us 
well on our way, but more analysis is clearly needed. This Page Intentionally Left Blank